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In the
Supreme Cottrt of the State of Utah
ALBE I{T J. COPE, i\rhninistrator de
bonis non of the Estate of Francis
Cope, Deceased,
Plai,ntiff and Appellant,
~rl~~RLIN R. LYBBERT, Administrator of the Estate of \Villiam P.
Epperson, deceased; ALLAN SHOTT,
JR., ELOISE B. SHOTT; and ADELPHINE COPE Sl TDBURRY,
.A.drlitional Plaintiffs and Appellants,
-vs.BOUNTIFUL LIVESTOCK COMpANY, DA"'\TIS COUNTY, a municipal corporation, BRYANT JACOBS, Treasurer of Davis County,
State of Utah, SALT LAKE PIPELINE COMPAN\T, a Nevada corporation, and SALT LAI{:E REFINING
CO:JIP ANY, a Nevada corporation,
Defendants 01nd Respondents.

Case No.

9531

BRIEF O:B., RESPONDENTS
BOUNTIFUL LIVESTOCK COMPANY,
SALT LAKE PIPELINE C0~1P ANY, AND
SALT LAKE REFINING COMPANY.

STATE~IENT

OF FACTS

These respondents do not dispute those facts as between them and appellants as set forth in appellant's
brief. Such statement is, however, insufficient to enable
the Court properly to understand the nature of the entire
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case and to make a proper disposition of the same. For
this reason, the following statement is made.
The facts are not in dispute. Three cases are actually
involved here. The essential facts are the same in each
case and for brevity we will treat them as one. The plaintiffs are the successors in interest of prior owners of real
property in Davis County, Utah. No taxes upon such
premises have been paid by plaintiffs or their predecessors in interest since 1932 and for all practical purposes the property was abandoned by them. Auditor's
deeds were issued to Davis County in 1937. Davis County
desired to place the property on the tax rolls and in 1943
entered into a contract to sell the same. The contract was
made with one David E. Howard on behalf of Bountiful
Livestock Company. David E. Howard was originally
joined herein as a party defendant but died during the
pendency of the action. On October 18, 19±±, the purchase
price of the property was paid and the same \Yas conveyed by Davis County to Bountiful Livestock Company.
A portion of the property \Yas, on February 11, 1956,
sold and conveyed by the livestock company to Salt Lake
Pipeline Company, \vhich, in turn, on Xovember 21,
1956, conveyed to Salt Lake Refining Con1pany. Bountiful Livestock Company \Vent into possession of the property in 1943 and has re1nained in possession and except
as to the parcel sold to the pipeline con1pany has continually used the premises for its livestock operations
since that date. All taxes levied upon the premises have
been paid by Bountiful Livestock Co1npany and its successor in interest since 1944. (Deposition 1-21, R. 171172.)
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At the tin1e of the sale to Bountiful Livestock Company in 19-!3, the Board of Co1nmissioners of Davis
County consisted of three Inembers. One of the members
'vas Amasa Howard. He "·a~ a brother of David llo,vard
and was in 1943 a director and president of BountifuL
Livestock Company and the owner of approximately
t"·enty per cent of its stock. At the time of the offer
of purchase in 1943, the County Commissioners inspected
the property involved and thereafter by unanimous vote
approved the sale to the livestock company. The sale was
1nade at the fair value of the property. Amasa Howard
'vas not chairman of the Board of County Commissioners.
He did not move for the approval of the sale and has not
profited frorn the transaction. (Deposition 1-21, R. 171172.)
The complaints of the plaintiffs are uruque. They
are not in the form of actions to quiet title or for ejectInent. The plaintiffs apparently recognized the controlling effect of certain statutes hereinafter considered
and sought to avoid such statutes by attempting to
ground their actions under the Declaratory Judgments
.._\ct. They do not allege a controversy or any justiciable
issue usually deemed necessary to found an action under
such act. They affirmatively allege that the livestock
company took possession of the property at the time of
sale, and has ever since the sale, had the use, benefit and
occupation of the premises. As we understand, the contentions of the plaintiffs, they proceed upon the theory
that the tax sale proceedings under which Davis County
acquired its tax title were a nullity; that the deed from
Davis County to the livestock company was likewise a
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nullity; that the plaintiffs are entitled to the value of
the use and occupation of the premises from the livestock co1npany and that their only obligation may be to
pay some taxes to Davis County. It is suggested that the
actions are in the nature of equitable suits to redeem
the premises, but the allegations of the complaints are
not framed in the language usually ernployed in suits
in equity. Whatever the nature of the actions may be
construed to be, these plaintiffs cannot avoid the controlling effect of the statutes and principles of law here
considered and this case must be determined by the application of such statutes and principles. (R. 1-5, 24-25,
41, 46-48.)
The position of these defendants in this rather conlplicated case has been that: (i) The deed from Davis
County to the livestock comp·any is valid. (ii) If there
be any invalidity in the deed the same is voidable and not
void. (iii) If any claim exists to set the deed aside such
clai1n is held by Davis County and not by these plaintiffs. ( iv) Because of the controlling effect of our statutes of limitations and adverse possession, plaintiffs have
no right in any event to recover. The defendants, Salt
Lake Pipeline Company, and Salt Lake Refining Conlpany, also assert that they are innocent purchasers for
value without notice of any defect in the Davis County
deed. Ho,vever this defense 'Yill not be reached in the
disposition of plaintiffs' claims. The defendant, Davis
County, admits the facts herein set forth, but as against
the claim of plaintiffs pleads in bar the statutes herein
considered. (Transcript 1-21.)
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The issues involved here as between the plaintiffs
and the defendants \vere first fully explored by the trial
court on plaintiffs' n1otion for summary judgment. (R.
7-t--75) Briefs "·ere subrnitted on the issues involved under such rnotion. (R. 1~3-14-t) Plaintiffs' briefs are made
a part of the record, but the briefs of defendants are for
soine reason omitted. X evertheless, the trial court considered all the issues and denied plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment. (R. 149) The matter then came on
for hearing on pretrial. These defendants 'vould have
preferred to have considered the issues in the order indicated above, however the trial court preferred to pass
directly to the question of whether the deed was voidable
or void. (Transcript 1-21) The defendants did not, of
course, in submitting such issue, concede that the deed
was in any manner invalid. The trial court upon consideration of the matter determined that the plaintiffs
had no basis for recovery in any event and entered the
judgment of dismissal from 'vhich this appeal is taken.
(R.170-175)

By cross complaint Davis County asserts against
its co-defendants the invalidity of the deed to the livestock company. These defendants, as against such cross
complaint, assert the validity of the deed, statutes of
limitations, and of adverse possession, estoppel, and as
to the pipeline company and its grantee the further defense that they were innocent purchasers for value without notices of any claims of Davis County. (R. 12-15,
18-21, 27-34, 89-98)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

Appellants seems to contend that the trial court held
that Davis County had the right to set aside the deed
to the livestock company. The record is clearly to the.
contrary. The only issues determined were under the
complaint. No issues have been framed by the Court under the cross complaint, and the trial court very carefully
reserved all issues as between Davis County and its codefendants. Upon the trial of that phase of the case,
these defendants will assert every defense available to
then1 under the facts and the issues there presented. (R.
170-177)
We are convinced that the judgn1ent of the trial
court is necessarily compelled by the facts in this case
and fully disposes of the entire case as bet\\Teen the plaintiffs and the defendants. "\Y.hile the issue for immediate
consideration before the court on pretrial was whether
at the suit of plaintiffs the deed to the livestock company
'vas voidable or void, the judgn1ent of the court, being
for dismissal of the action necessarily encompasses any
question as to the right of the plaintiffs to recover. The
findings of the trial court are sufficient to support a
complete disposition of this case, (R. 170-175) and inasInuch as there are no issues of fact \Yhich would be Inaterial to such a determination, \Ye think it is essential
that all of the questions \Yhich Inight in any event arise
in this case be explored and the entire matter be presented to this Court in order that as bet"Teen the plaintiffs and all defendants this 1natter 1nay be laid at rest.
For this reason, \Ve have undertaken in this brief to express our vie\vs on each issue \Yhirh may be necessary
fully to dispose of plaintiffs' clai1n.
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ST:\ TE~II~~XT OF

POL~TS

I)<> I :\T~ I.
AT THE

OF PJ_J .. \INTIB.,FS THE DEED
F~H<>~I
1)~\ \'"IS COlTXT,\'" TO BOtT:KTIFl~I~
I~ L\'" I~~srr< )C 1\: CO:JI J> """:\KY IS \'~\LID.
St~rrl,

(a) The Penalt~~ of the Statute Tnvolved Falls
upon the Individual, not upon the Deed.
(b) The \'"ote of An1asa Howard \Vas Not Xecessary to Authorize the Sale to Bountiful
Livestock Company.
POINT II.
IF THE DEED FRO:.\I DA \:IS COlT~T1~ TO
BOTTNTIFlJL LI\TESTOCI( COMPANY BE IN
ANY l\l.t\~NER IN\~ALID, IT IS AT l\fOST
VOIDABLE AND NOT VOID.
POINT III.
IF THE DEED FROl\1 DA\'IS COl~NTY TO
Bor:K1,IFUL LI\TESTOCK CO~IP AXY IS
\'"OID . \BLE, PijAINTIFFS H A\'" E NO
CAUSE OF AC TION TO SET THE DEED
ASIDE.
1

POINT IV.
IN NO E\'"E:NT ~IA Y THE PLAINTIFFS RECOVER IN THIS CASE.
(a) Plaintiffs Can Succeed Only on the Strength
of Their O"rn Title.
(b) Whether the Deed from Davis County to
Bountiful Livestock Company is \ . oid or
,~ oidable, Plaintiffs are no'v Barred from
Instituting this Action by Reason of the
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Provisions of the Special Statutes of Limittion Relating to Tax Titles.
(c) In Any Event, the Deed from Davis County
to Bountiful Livestock Company is a Written Instrument upon which Bountiful Livestock Company and its Successors can found
a Defense based upon Adverse Possession.
(d) Plaintiffs are now Barred by the General
Adverse Possession Statutes.
(e) The Bar which Prevents Plaintiffs from Recovery against Bountiful Livestock Company, Salt Lake Pipeline Company and Salt
Lake Refining Company Likewise Bars the
Plaintiffs from any Recovery against Davis
County.
ARGUnfEXT
POINT I.
AT THE SUIT OF PLAINTIFFS THE DEED
FROM DAVIS COuNTY TO BOUNTIFUL
LIVESTOCK C0~1:PANY IS \TALID.
The deed from Davis County to Bountiful Livestock
Company is valid for two reasons:
(a) The Penalty of the Statute Involved Falls
upon the Individual, not upon the Deed.
(b) The Vote of Amasa Ho,vard Was X ot N ecessary to Authorize the Sale to Bountiful
Livestock Comp,any.
Statutes which deal \Yith the subject of the interest
of a public officer in transactions 'vith the public body
are of two kinds, namely, (i) those 'vhich impose a penal-
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ty upon the officer for violation of the statute, and (ii)
those which invalidate the transaction.
Section 17-5-10, lT tah Code Annotated, 1953, prohibits a board member from being interested in transactions \Yith his county. Penalties are imposed for violation of this section under other statutory provisions, including those providing for removal from office. Thus
the offending officer may be subjected to punishment.
The statute does not, however, render invalid the transaction.
The statute here involved relating to county officers should be compared with Section 10-6-38, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, relating to city officers, which contains
the prohibitive provisions and also pTovides that any
prohibited contract shall be void.
Section 17-5-10 was construed by this Court in Engle
v. District Court of Carbon County, 96 Utah 245, 85
P.2d 627, where accusation proceedings taken against the
County Commissioner Engle for violation of said section
were sustained. The decision in that case demonstrates
the operation of the statute. If the c·ounty Commissioner
Amasa Howard in voting for the sale of the premises
to Bountiful Livestock Company violated the pTovisions
of said section, then Howard may have been guilty of an
offense for which appropriate proceedings could have
been taken against him. This remedy against the individual, however, is wholly separate and distinct from
the transaction itself, and the personal liability of the
officer does not destroy the validity of the deed to
Bountiful Livestock Company.
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This principle is demonstrated in the case of Marshall v. Elmwood City Borongh (Pa.) 41 Atl. 994. In that
case I\Iarshall brought an action against the City to restrain it from paying out money under a contract with
Elmwood Water Company. The fact '"as that one of the
1nembers of the Borough Council, at the time of the enactment of an ordinance for a contract 'vith the \\Tater Company, was disqualified from voting because he was then
secretary of the Water Company. The statute involved
prescribed penal consequences in such a situation. The
court pointed out, however, that those consequences
were personal to the offender and did not in terms extend to or embrace the legal effect of the municipal contract in which he participated. In sustaining the contract,
the court at page 995 of the Atlantic Reporter employs
the following language:
"The contract inherently 'vas a perfectly legitimate contract, 'vhich the parties "~ere at liberty
to make. Hence the authorities cited for the appellant in which contracts 1nade by a municipality
with a prohibited person, such as a n1ember of
councils or a member of a purchasing comn1ittee,
or by a county board of co1n1nissioners "ith one
of its o'vn body, are held to be invalid, haYe no
application. * * * The Penal Code of 1860 prohibited a member of a 1nunicipality fro1n being
interested in a contract for furnishing supplies
or materials to the corporation, and i1nposed personal penalties upon hi1n if he Yiolated the act,
and to these penalties he is, of course, liable.
But the invalidity of such a contract is not declared as a penal consequence, or as any consequence of such a situation."
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In Grady v. City of IJi·vingston, (Mont.) 141 P. 2d
:3-t:G, actions "·pre brought by tax paying plaintiffs to
recover on behalf of the City of Livingston money paid
by the ( ity to various corporate defendants. The money
sought to be recovered 'vas for merchandise sold and delivered to the City by the defendants. At the time the
goods were bought by the City, certain members of
the City Council were employees or officials of the defendant corporations. The trial court refused recovery
and the Supreme Court in a divided opinion affirmed.
The Montana statute was much like ours except that it
contained provisions that contracts made in violation
of the statute could be avoided at the instance of any
party except the officers interested therein. The follo·wring language employed in the opinion of Mr. Justice
Morris, appearing at page 352 of the Pacific Reporter
is rna terial here :
1

". . . We do not think there is any rule of
equity that ernpowers any court to penalize a corporation on the ground that one of its agents,
while serving a municipality, violated his trust as
an officer of the municipality. The respectiv~
obligations of the official to his employer on the
one hand and to the municipality on the other are
separate and distinct. There is no relation whatever between the t'vo. The employer is no more
blamable for the action of the employee public
official than the city. The remedy for violation
of either does not depend in the slightest degree
upon the other. The code sections mentioned and
section 10827 'vere obviously intended to punish
and to purge the public service of persons who
betray the public trust reposed in them, not to
confiscate the property of business concerns,
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whose employees they happen to be. There is another, and a distinct remedy for the latter.''
The vote of Amasa l-Io,\·ard 'vas not necessary to
the sale. The vote of other Comn1issioners was sufficient.
The transaction may therefore be sustained. See Mar-

shall v. Elwood City Borough, supra, where the court
at page 995 of the Atlantic Reporter observed as follows:
~'The council consisted of six members, of
whom five were present when the ordinance in
question was proposed. The whole five voted in
favor of the ordinance, one of them being l\Ir. Roelofs. Four votes were a clear majority of the
whole number of councilmen. None of these four
members was disqualified, and the ordinance was
passed by a majority of the \vhole number of melnbers without any regard being had to the vote of
Mr. Roelofs. IIis vote, therefore, had no legal
efficacy in the passage of the ordinance. It was
passed by the qualified vote of the other four
members. Does an ordinance which has enough
legal votes to sustain it become illegal because
there were other persons - one or more -voting
in its favor who were not qualified to vote 1 It
would be an astonishing proposition to submit that
an ordinance in a body of fifty or a hundred members, which \vas passed by a considerable majority
of perfectly qualified vote~, should be declared illegal because it had received the supporting vote
of one member who \Ya~ disqualified. \\~ e have
not been referred to any decision of any court
holding such a doctrine, and \Ve cannot imagine
that any such decision can be found. We kno\v of
no reason, in the present case, ·w·hy the invalid vote of one member of the council should
be held to invalidate the perfectly legal vote of the
other four 1nembers."
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Counsel for appellant~ rite and rely on City of San
Diego v. San Diego /..~ Los L1ngeles Rrt?'lroad Con71Hli~Jf,
(Cal.) ·~4 Cal. 106. In that case, ho,wPver, it appears
that two of the three me1nbers of the Board of Trustees
of the City voted in favor of making a grant of land to
the Railroad Company and the third member of the board
voted against ~uch transfer. One of the two board men1bers voting in favor of the transfer was a stockholder
and director of the Railroad Company. The court said:
"We do not doubt that a majority of the
trustees might execute the power but the question
is, whether Sherman, \vho \\~as a stockholder and
director of the Railroad Company, could be one
of that majority."
Upon the grounds hereinabove set forth
the deed to the Livestock c·ompany is valid.

\\~e

submit

POINT II.
IF T·HE DEED FRO~f DAVIS COUNTY TO
BOUNTIFUL LIVESTOCK COMPANY BE IN
ANY MANNER INVALID, IT IS AT MOST
VOIDABLE AND NOT "\TOID.
Before proceeding "~ith a consideration of the cases
in support of the proposition stated above, it is well to
observe again the background of the transaction under
attack. The record indicates that the parties proceeded
in good faith to enter into the contract in 1943 and to execute the deed in 1944. The price paid represented the
fair value of the property. Davis County executed and
delivered the deed and received the consideration therefor, and has for some sixteen years collected and received
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taxes from the grantee or its successors. (Deposition 121) It was to the benefit and advantage of Davis County
to restore the property to the tax rolls and there is no
doubt that the County had the power to sell the property
as it did. It had the power to vest title in the purchaser
and the grantee corporation had the power to take and
receive title to real property. The only impairment in th,)
entire transaction lies in the fact that Amasa Howard,
one of the Commissioners of Davis County, was an officer
and director of the livestock company. L"nder the circumstances, in view of the long lapse of time and benefits
which have accrued to Davis County, it \\Tould require
the rnost impelling reasons to invoke the harsh and punitive rule that the deed to the livestock company \Ya~
a complete and utter nullity and that no title \vhatever
passed to the purchaser Bountiful Livestock Company.
There is no hard and fast rule as to \Yhether a deed
rnay be voidable or void. The ans\ver depends not only
upon all the facts and rircurnstances involved in a case.
the statutes under \vhich the pro blern arises, but also
upon the parties who assert the contention. Thus it rnay
very well be that as to some persons and under son1e
circumstances the deed rnay be valid, but as to other
persons and under other circumstances the deed rnay be
voidable or void. This is particularly true in a situation
such as that presented here, \Yhere the plaintiffs seek to
set aside a deed not on behalf of the County, \vho \vas
a party to the transaction~ but against the County and
adverse to it, in the vary san1e action in \Yhich the County
itself seeks to set aside the deed upon the basis of its own
independent clain1. l\foreover, there is the utmost con-
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fusion in the deci~ion8 in the use of the ter1ns '·void" and
"voidable." In a strietP:--;t sense a void instrument is a
nullity, \vhile a voidable instrument is one \vhich is valid
until set aside b~; one having a right to do so. It i ~ seldo111
that an instrtnnent is a complete nullity as to all persons
and tmder all circumstances. In n1ost situations \\~her0
the courts use the term Bvoid" they actually mean voidable at the suit of a party having a right to set the instrument aside.
These principles have been announced in a great
many cases. We think there is no benefit to the Court
in extensive citations of such cases. The most careful
statement of the la\\~ ""hich we have found is that set
forth in State v. Riclun ond (New Hampshire) 26 N.H.
( 6 Fost.) 232-237, as follo,vs :
"There is in our books great looseness and no
little confusion in the use of the terms 'void' and
'voidable,' gro\Ying, perhaps, in some degree out
of the in1perfeetion of our language. There are
at least four kinds of defects which are included
under these expressions, while \Ye have but those
t""O terms to express them all. 2 Kent, Co1n1n.
~3-l:; 7 Bac. Abr. 64, ,, . . oid and , . . oidable'; 22 \Tin.
Abr. 12, '\T oid and \: oidable'; J ac. La\v Diet.
',. . oid.' (1) Proceedings may be wholly void,
""ithout force or effect as to all persons and for
all purposes, and incapable of being or being made
otherwise. This is the broadest sense of the \Yord,
but the cases which fall \vithin this signification
are probably not numerous. (2) Things may be
void as to some persons and for some purposes,
and as to them incapable of being otherwise, \vhich
are yet valid as to other persons and effectual for
other purposes; as a deed executed by an idiot,
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and by others capable of contracting, 1nay be
void as to the idiot, and yet binding as to the
others. An instrument in form of a deed, but
without a seal, may be void as a conveyance, and
, yet be binding for some other purposes. (3)
Things may be void as to all persons and for all
purposes, or as to some persons and for some
purposes, though not so as to others, until they
are confirmed; but, though said to be void, they
are not so in the broadest sense of that term, because they have a capacity of being confirmed,
and after such confinnation they are binding. For
this kind of defect our language affords no distinctive term. They are strictly neither voidthat is, mere nullities-nor voidable, because they
do not require to be avoided, but until confirmed
they are without validity. They are usually spoken
of as void; and, as usage is the only law of language, they are so called correctly. It is, therefore, always to be considered an open question,
to be decided by the connection and othenvise,
'vhether the term 'void' is used in a given instance
in one or the other of these in some respects dissimilar senses. ( 4) Contracts and proceedings
are properly called voidable which are valid and
effectual until they are avoided by some act.
Prima facie they are valid. but they are subject
to defects, of which some person has a right to
take advantage, ""ho 1nay by proper proceedings
for that purpose entirely defeat and destroy them.
Voidable contracts are in general . perhaps al"~ays~
like the last class referred to, capable of confirmation by the party "~ho has the right to avoid them.
1 Bouv. Inst. S 1321. ~tatters 'Yhich are properly
voidable are very commonly spoken of as void.
Smith v. Saxton, 23 :1\lass. ( 6 Pick.) 483, +87. Technically and legally speaking, they are improperly
so called. But the 'vord 'void' is so often used
by good writers, and even by legal "~ri ters, in the
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sense of invalid, inpffectual, or not binding, that
it can hardl)T be said that this is not a correct
and legitimate use o i' the term. Our books are full
of examvles of the loose and inaccurate use of
these word~, and n1any difficult questions have
grown out of this circumstance. They are so con1mon that \Ye think no strong inference can be
justly dra"\vn fro1n the unqualified use of these
word~ as to the particular kind or degree of invalidity· 1neant, \Yhere the attention of the court
is not clearly directed to that point."
The principles stated above are summarized by the
Supreme Court of the l;nited States and other authorities as follows:
"It is rarely that things are 'vholly 'void' and
"\vithout force and effect as to all persons and for
all purposes, and incapable of being made otherwise. Things are 'voidable' which are valid and
effectual until they are avoided by son1e act; \vhile
things are often said to be 'void' "\vhich are 'vithout
validity until confirmed. Toy Toy v. Hopkins,
29 S. Ct. 416, 417, 212 1T.S. 542, 53 L. Ed. 6-1--t, citing 8 Bac. Abr. : E,vell v. Daggs, 2 S. Ct. 408,
108 U.S. 143, 27 L. Ed. 682; Weeks v. Bridgman,
16 S. Ct. 72, 74, 159 U.S. 541, 40 L. Ed. 253, 255;
Louisville '.rrust Co. v. Comingor, 22 S. Ct. 293,
296, 184 U.S. 18, 25, 46 L. Ed. 413, 416."
It is in the light of these principles and the facts
involved that the question must be considered.
The situation presented here is quite analogous to
that involving an executed contract. ~Iany cases of such
character have been presented to the courts and the rules
frequently announced to the effect that 'vhere the contract has been executed and the municipality has received
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all of the benefits thereunder, the person \vho has conferred those benefits \vhile he 1nay be unable to sue directly upon the contract, may nevertheless recover in
equity the reasonable value of the benefit conferred upon
the municipality. Such a result could be reached upon
the theory that the contract is voidable only and not
completely void.
In Town of Hartley v. Floete Lu1nlJer Co., (lo\\Ta),
171 N.W. 183, a stockholder director and manager of a
corporation and who was also a member of the City
Council voted to purchase merchandise from the corporation. The merchandise was duly purchased and used by
the municipality and warrants issued in pay1nent of the
materials furnished. After the City had received the
materials and used them, a suit \Yas brought by the Town
Council to cancel the warrants in the hands of the Company. The defendant Company in a cross-petition sought
to recover the fair value of the goods sold. This, then,
presented a situation \Vhere recovery \Yas not sought on
the contract itself but for the fair value of the goods sold.
The court had occasion to revie\\T the general la\\T on the
subject of the enforcement of such contracts, announcing
the principles \vhich we have considered here, and then
ntade the following observations:
"The thought running through the cases seems
to be that one entrusted 'vith the business of
others cannot be allo\Yed to n1ake such business
an object of pecuniary profit to himself. X othing
can be added to \Yhat has been alreadY said bY
this Court on this question. Such contracts ar·e
voidable at common la\Y. This Court has refused
to recognize the1n or enforce the1n. * * * But the
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question still remains: Is this defendant con1pany 'vithout remedy in
court of equity. The
contract, it is true, 'vas made in violation of publi(•
policy, and the contract, as such, "Tas not enforceable in law or equity, and, ""'hile executor~~, an~r
attempt to enforce it "'ould have been enjoined.
It was a voidable contract, and, upon proper sho,,T_
ing, the courts refused to recognize and enforce
it. '\: e have, however, this situation before us:
The plaintiff city acted through its coun;-;el - a
body of men of its O\vn choosing. The things involved in this suit were needed by the city. The
city had a right to, and because of its needs it \Yas
its duty, to purchase these things some\vhere.
The purchase 'vas neither against the statute nor
contrary to public policy. The purchase was not
'vrongful in itself. It only became unenforceable
because of the relationship of the parties to the
transaction."

a

In Mares v. Janutka, (~finn.) 264 N.W. 222, residents
and taxpayers of the City of ~Iontgomery sued to compel
the defendant to restore to the City Treasury certain
money received by him for the sale of merchandise and
material to the City during the time he was a member
of the City Council. There appeared to be no doubt that
the defendant as a member of the City Council, made
sales to the City for merchandise at a fair price. The
City used the merchandise, obtained the benefit of, and
paid for the same. The plaintiffs, being taxpayers,
brought to suit to compel the defendant to pay back the
money. The court refused to permit the recovery and
stated the rule as follows:
"When such officer sells to his municipality
property "Tithin its municipal powers to acquire
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and use, and it is so arq uired and used, liability
may be enforced quasi ex contractu, but in no
event beyond the value of the property to the
municipality.''
The contract between the City and the officer was voidable but not void. Had it been utterly void a court of
equity "\vould not have permitted retention of the selling
price of the property.
In Trainerv. Wolfe, (Pa.), 21 Atl. 391, a school board
purchased a school site of land which was owned by one
of its members. The school district paid out the money
and received the title to the property. Thereafter suit
was brought by certain taxpayers to set the transaction
aside. The court in sustaining the transaction said in
part:
•' We have, then, the case of a sale of real
estate where the same person is both vendor and
vendee. The law under said circumstances is well
settled. The sale is not void; it is 1nerely voidable."
See also Grady v. City of Lit·ingston,

(~font.)

supra.

Consideration "\Yill no"\Y be given to the cases cited
by appellants. Hardy v. 1lfayor of City of Gaines1._;,ille
(Ga.) 48 S.E. 921, is an action brought by a citizen
against tlu~ City to enjoin it fron1 perfor1ning a certain
contract. This is typical of a number of cases "~hich
will be found in the books "~here a citizen on behalf of a
municipality and acting for it seeks to enjoin the perfornlance of an executorY contract entered into in violation of some statutory provision~. Ca~Ps of this character
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are clearly not 'vithin the facts or principles involved
here. \V e are not dealing with an executory contract but
a transaction fully perfonned on both sides and which
has been acted upon by the parties for many years. )loreover, the plaintiffs are not seeking to protect any right
or interest of Davis County but are, as we have shown,
proceeding against Davis County, seeking to recover the
property adverse to it.
ln Githens v. Butler County (l\lo.) 165 S.W. 2d 650,
the wife of a county judge purchased certain county
property and thereafter brought suit against the county
to quiet the title to the same. The county counterclaiined,
seeking to set aside the deed and tendered into court the
amount of money paid by the plaintiff in the purchase of
the property. The court held that because of the relationship of husband and wife under Missouri law, the judge
had an indirect interest in the prop,erty so purchased
by his wife of such character that the deed could be set
aside. In this case, the county felt compelled and the
court agreed that the county 'vas obligated to pay back
to the plaintiff the purchase price of the property. This
could only be on the theory that the purchase was voidable. Had the purchase been a nullity, the county would
not have been obligated to pay back the purchase price.
There is certainly nothing in this case which aids the
plaintiffs in their suit for the reason, as we have pointed
out at the outset, they are proceeding not for the benefit
of the County, but adversely to it.
Baker v. Scofield, 243 U.S. 114, does not seem to be
In point. In that case suit \Vas brought by a receiver
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of a bank to recover back property 'vhich had been
transferred to a corporation controlled by a prior receiver and purchased with funds of the bank. The court
properly held that the property should be recovered back.
This would appear to be entirely consistent "'ith the
theory that the deed 'vas voidable and consistent Inoreover with the proposition that the cause of action to recover the property back belonged to the receiver of the
bank. By analogy it would appear clear that if there is
any cause of action here to recover the property from
Bountiful Livestock Company or its successors, such
cause of action belongs to Davis County, the party 'vho
conveyed to Bountiful Livestock Company, and not by
the plaintiffs here who are actually strangers seeking to
gain a windfall against Davis County.

H e1'1J'Yl.essy v. A uto1nobile Owners Insurance Association (Tex.), 282 S.W. 791, is directly contrary to the
contentions of appellants. There the plaintiff purchased
a second-hand automobile 'vithout demanding and receiving the license fee, receipt, or bill of sale required by
Texas la,v. Thereafter, he sold the car to another, retaining a mortgage to secure payment of the amount o'ving
to him. The plaintiff likewise failed to transfer and deliver to the purchaser the license fee receipt or bill of sale
at the time he sold the car. Plaintiff obtained an insurance policy on the car to protect his interest therein by
reason of the mortgage. The ear 'vas stolen and destroyed and plaintiff sought to recover. The t'vo lower
courts held he was not entitled to do so, but the Supreme
Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover,
saying in part :
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~' \Ve

cannot agree with the holding that the
plaintiff in error, Hennessy, got no title to the
automobile when he purchased it in violation of
the requiren1ents of the act, and that title did not
pass to Chisholm on the sale to him. Hennessy ·had
an insurable interest in the property insured, and
we recommend that the judg1nents of both the
courts be reversed, and the cause remanded to the
district court."
In Stockton Morris Land Co. v. California Tractor
& Equipment Corp., (C·al.) 247 P. 2d 90, a tractor company and a finance company jointly made arrangements
\vhereby the tractor company sold certain equipment to a
county and thereafter assigned the contract to the finance
co1npany. The contract with the county was not executed
as required by law, and consequently the finance company could not recover against the county, but brought
suit against the tractor company under the warranties
of its assignment. The court held that the finance company could not recover against the tractor company
for the simple reason that the finance company had in
effect joined with the tractor company in selling the
property to the county. This again is a situation where
a court denied enforcement of an invalid executory contract. The books are full of such cases but as "\Ve have
pointed out they have no application here.
The City of San Diego v. S.an D.iego & Los Angeles
Railroad Company, supra, is actually an authority in
favor of respondents because the language of the court
clearly indicates that a transaction authorized by t'vo
qualified members of a municipal body may be valid
even though the third member was disqualified, providing
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

24

the t\YO qualified n1e1nbers vote in favor of the transaction.

Tuscan, et al v. Smith, et al., (1\Ie.) 153 Atl. :2H9,
presents a situation in which certain inhabitant~ of a
to,vn brought suit against certain individuals for the cancellation of a lease. This again is a case in 'vhich suit is
brought on behalf of a town to terminate an executory
contract.
In Miller v. 1lfcKinnon, (Cal.) 124 P. 2d 3-!, suit ""as
brought by a taxpayer on behalf of Santa Clara County
against the partnership and the members thereof and
certain county officers to recover money clain1ed to have
been illegally expended by the county and received by
the partnership. The contention was that the county
failed to procure bids for the work as required by statute.
The case went up on appeal from an order sustaining a
demurrer to the complaint. The court held that the complaint stated a cause of action. A·gain, this is a typical
situation in a proceeding directly between the county and
persons dealing with it. It does not touch a situation
as presented here, ''"'here the plaintiff seeks to proceed
adversely against a county in a suit in "'"hich the county
itself seeks to set aside a deed.
Appellants quote from 14 Am. Jur., Counties, Section -+2, Page 211. The case cited in support of the text
is Cheney v. Unroe (Ind.) 77 N.E. 1041. In that case
plaintiff was appointed by the county to superintend some
high'''"ay construction on its behalf. He was paid for this
work by the county. In addition to such service for the
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county, he entered into the employment of the contractor
on the job at a stipulated sum per day. He sued the
contractor for his compensation. He thus sought to be
paid from both sides on the contract. The court held that
he was not entitled to recover and properly so.
Appellants also quote from 20 C.J.S., Counties, Section 192, Page 1028. The case in support of the text there
is Logan County v. Edw.ards (Ky.) 266 S.W. 917. In that
case the county brought suit against Edwards to recover
certain moneys paid to Edwards upon claims 'vhich were
approved against the county. It appears that Edvvards
\Vas former county judge and a member of a fiscal court
\vhich voted for the allowance of the claims. The claiins
were in favor of Edwards and a drygoods company, of
which he was the principal owner. The court held that
under the Kentucky statute, the allo,vance of the claiins
were invalid. The case arose on demurrer and the court
held that the complaint stated a cause of action against
Edwards. This again is a direct action by the county
against the former judge.
This leaves for consideration only the case of Clark
v. Utah Constru-ction Co. (Idaho) 8 P. 2d 454. In that
case it appears that Clark as a member of the Board of
County Commissioners of Ada County, Idaho, executed
a deed to certain tax property to his wife, Dora A. Clark.
Because of the community pToperty laws in effect in
Idaho, the court reached the conclusion that the deed
from Clark to his wife was in effect a conveyance to
him of property and void under Idaho la\v. The action
in question, however, arose under unusual circumstances.
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Utah Construction Company had been grazing sheep
on the land in question. Clark as assignee of hi~ wife,
brought suit against the Construction Company to recover damages for trespass. In order to sustain his right
to recovery, Clark introduced the deed from himself to
his wife and an a.ssign1nent from her to him of his clain1
to recover for the trespass. The validity of the deed to
Clark's wife was raised as a defense by the Construction
Company. The Idaho statute made the violation of its
provisions a felony and further provided that:
"Every contract made in violation of any of
the provisions of the two preceding sections may
be avoided at the instance of any party except the
officer interested therein."
Linder these statutory provisions the court held that the
defendant Construction Company was entitled to assert
the invalidity of the deed to Clark's ,,~ife. The Court held
that the plaintiff could not recover against the Construction Company for the alleged trespass and simply left the
parties "\vhere it found them. While the court uses broad
language respecting the invalidity of the deed, there is
actually nothing in the case which assists the plaintiffs
in their claim here. Neither the facts or the statutes involved in the Clark case are presented here. :Jioreover,
it must be manifest that the plaintiffs cannot, for their
own personal benefit, attack the deed adversely to Davis
County in the very same suit in which Davis County is
itself for the public benefit undertaking to assert the
invalidity of the deed.
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POINT III.
IF THE l)l~~ED FROl\1 D1\ \'"1S COUNTY TO
BOli~rPIFUL LI\TESTOCK COn1PANY IS
'!(>IDABLE, PLAINTIFFS HAVE NO
C.:\lTBE OF ACTION TO SET THE DEED
.:\SIDE.
\Ve have seen that whether a deed is voidable or void
depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
OnP of the deterrninative facts is who asserts such invalidity. The problem here i~ not \vhether, as an abstract
question, the deed from Davis County to Bountiful Live~tock Company is invalid. The question is \vhether the
deed is invalid at the suit of the plaintiffs. That is a
totally different question from whether the deed may
be set aside at the suit of Davi~ County. These defendants do not concede that Davis County has any rights to
set the deed aside, and the trial court ha~ expressly reserved that question. Whatever result might ultimately
be reached in the trial of the issues under the cross complaint
submit that under the alignment of the parties
and the i~~ues in this case the plaintiffs have no standing
to ass-ert such invalidity.

,,.e

\\. . e are sure that counsel for appellants have made
diligent search to find some authority where, under an
align1nent of parties and \\Tith issues such as are presented
here, a court has held that parties in the position of
the~r plaintiffs might assert against the county itself the
invalidity of a deed such as that delivered to the livestock
company. From the foregoing analysis it is seen that none
of the authorities cited by appellant support such a contention. \\re have found no such case and \ve are sure
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that no court of last resort has ever so held. All of the
cases "\Yhich we have found fall into either on,e class or
another, namely, (i) cases in which a taxpayer is himself
on behalf of the governmental body, seeking, to prevent
or set aside some transaction, or ( ii) cases in which the
governmental body itself has sought to assert some right.
No case has been found where a person in the position of
these plaintiffs has been able to assert such a claim adversely to the governmental body.
POINT IV.
IN NO EVENT niAY THE PLAINTIFFS RECOVER IN THIS CASE.
(a) Plaintiffs Can Succeed Only on the Strength
of Their Own Title.
Whether these proceedings are viewed as an action
to quiet title or an equitable suit to redeem, or however
viewed, the plaintiffs are in effect seeking to establish
and quiet their title against the claims of all the defendants including Davis County. It is therefore necessary
to consider the nature of the burden "\vhich rests upon the
plaintiffs and the proof which must be made "\vith respect
to the title which they claim to the property in question.
The rule has been announced in a host of cases and
now constitutes a "\veil ·established principle 'vhich has
acquirPd the force of a maxim, that in suits to determine
adverse claims to property a plaintiff can recover only
on the strength of his own title and not on the weakness
of the title of his adversary. This proposition has been
often recognized by this Court. See Cottrell v. Pickering,
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~t~

Utah 62, 88 Pac. 696; Babcock v. Dangerfield, 98 l~tah
10, 94 P.2d 862; Mercur Coalition Jlining Co. v. Gannon,
ct al., 11~ Utah 13, 184 P. 2d 341 and Lyman v. National
Jlortgage Bond Corporation, 7 Utah 2d 123, 320 P. 2d
3~2, \Yhere at page 127 of the lTtah Report, the rule i~
stated to be that :
". . . Plaintiffs must succeed on the strength
of their own claim and not alone on the weakness of the defendant's claim in order to succeed

"
The foregoing rule is particularly important in the
disposition of the issues involved here as w·e shall hereafter demonstrate.
(b) Whether the Deed from Davis County to
Bountiful Livestock Company is Void or
Voidable, Plaintiffs are now Barred from
Instituting this Action by Reason of the
Provisions of the Special Statutes of Limittion Relating to Tax Titles.
In 1951, the Legislature, by Chapter 19, Laws of
1951, enacted five sections, being designated as 78-125.1, 78-12-5.2, 78-12-5.3, 78-12-7.1 and 78-12-12.1 1961
Pocket Supplement to Volu1ne 9, Utah Code Annotated,
1953. The first case under the 1951 statute was Hansen
v. Jf orris, 3 Utah 2d 311, 283 P. 2d 884, in which this
Court held the Act to be constitutional and sustained a
tax title. The next case was Peterson v. Callister,
6 Utah 2d 359, 313 P. 2d 814. In the second case, suit
'vas brought by a tax title holder to quiet the title.
Although it appeared that the auditor's deed to the county
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and the deed out from the county were defective, the
court sustained the tax title.
The next case which came before this Court \\Ta~
Lynutn v. Nat,ional Mortgage Bond Corporation, supra.
In both Han.sen v. Morris, and Peterson v. Callister,
supra, the plaintiff was the tax title holder seeking to
fluiet his title against the old owner. This 'vas likewise
the situation in LynLan v. National Mortgage Bond Corporation. In the present cases, the situation is reversed. The old O"'\vner is seeking to recover title against
the County and its grantee.
\Vhile, as pointed out herein, "'\Ye have no quarrel
"\vith the decisions in the foregoing three cases, the alignment of the parties makes a fundamental difference in
the cases in view of the foregoing rule that the plaintiffs
must rely upon the strength of their own title and not
upon the weakness of the title of the defendants.
Before considering these three cases further, it is
necessary to observe the scope of the five sections embodied in the 1951 Act. These sections covered three subjects, namely, (i) limitations of actions, (ii) adverse possession, and (iii) definition of terms. The t"\YO sections
dealing with limitations of actions are designated in said
Pocket Part to said \Tolume 9, as Sections 78-12-5.1 and
78-12-5.2 and provide as follo"'\vs:
"78-12-5.1. Seizure or possession "\Yithin seven
years - Proviso - Tax title. - No action for the
recovery of real property or for the possession
thereof shall be maintained, unless the plaintiff
or his predecessor "\vas seized or possessed of such
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propPrty within seven years fron1 the coinmenceInent of such action; provided, ho\v·ever, that 'vith
respect to actions or defenses brought or interposed for the recovery or possession of or to quiet
title or determine the o\vnership of real property
against the holder of a tax title to such property,
no such action or defense shall be commenced or
intPrposed more than four years after the date
of the tax deed, conveyance, or transfer creating
such tax title unless the person co1nmencing or
interposing such action or defense or his predecessor has actually occupied or been in possession of such property within four years prior to
the commencement or interposition of such action
or defense or within one year from the effective
date of this amendment."

78-12-5.2. Holder of tax title- Limitations
of action or defense - Proviso. - No action or
defense for the recovery or possession of real
property or to quiet title or determine the ownership thereof shall be commenced or interposed
against the holder of a tax title after the expiration of four years from the date of the sale conveyance or transfer of such tax title to any county,
or directly to any other purchase thereof at any
public or private tax sale and after the expiration
of one year from the date of this act. Provided,
ho\YeYer, that this section shall not bar any action
or defense by the O\vner of the legal title to such
property where he or his predecessor has actually
occupied or been in actual possession of such property 'vithin four years from the commencement or
interposition of such action or defense. And provided further, that this section shall not bar any
defense by a city or to\vn, to an action by the
holder of a tax title, to the effect that such cj t:v
or to,vn holds a lien again:;.:t such property 'vhich
is equal or superior to the claim of the holder of
such tax title."
H
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The two sections dealing with acquisition of title
by adverse possession are designated in said Pocket Part
as Sections 78-12-7.1 and 78-12-12.1 and provide as follows:
"78-12-7.1 Adverse possession - Presumption
- Proviso - Tax title. - In every action for the recovery or possession of real property or to quiet
title to or determine the owner thereof the person
establishing a legal title to such property shall
be presumed to have been possessed thereof within the time required by law; and the occupation
of such property by any other person shall be
deemed to have been under and in subordination
to the legal title, unless it appears that such property has been held and possessed adversely to
such legal title for seven years before the commencement of such action. Provided, however,
that if in any action any party shall establish
prima facie evidence that he is the owner of any
real property under a tax title held by him and his
predecessors for four years prior to the commencement of such action and one year after the
effective date of this amendment he shall be presumed to be the owner of such property by adverse
possession unless it appears that the owner of the
legal title or his predecssor has actually occupied
or been in possession of such property under such
title or that such tax title owner and his predecessors have failed to pay all the taxes levied or
assessed upon such property 'vi thin such four year
period."
"78-12-12.1. Possession and payment of taxes
- Proviso - Tax title. - In no case shall adverse
possession be established under the provisions of
this ·Code, unless it shall be sho"\\rn that the land
has been occupied and claimed for the period of
seven years continuously, and that the party, his
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predecessors and grantors have paid all the taxes
which have been levied and assessed upon such
land according to law. Provided, however, that
payment by the holder of a tax title to real property or his predecessors, of all the taxes levied and
assessed upon such real property after the delinquent tax sale or transfer under which he claims
for a period of not less than four years and for
not less than one year after the effective date of
this amendment, shall be sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of this section in regard to the payment of taxes necessary to establish adverse possession."
The section dealing with the definition of terins is
78-12-5.3 of said Pocket Part and defines "action" as
follows:

"* * * the word 'action' as used in this section
includes counterclaims and cross-complaints, and
all civil actions wherein affirmative relief is
sought."
The term "action" would therefore clearly include
these proceedings, however they are designated.
In Hansen v. Morris, S1tpra, this Court considered
said Sections 78-12-5.1 and 78-12-5.3, sustained the constitutionality of the Act and held that where the tax
title holder sought to quiet title, he was obligated as part
of his case to plead and prove possession and payment of
taxes for four years prior to the commencement of the
action.
The same sections were under consideration in Peterson v. Callister, supra. There, ho·w·ever, the deed to the
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county "\\Tas incomplete and lacked certain fonnalities
required by law. The Court answered these contentions
'vith the observation that it 'vas not necessary that title
pass to protect the tax title claimant, particularly in
view of the fact that defendant had notice of plaintiff 'R
occupancy of the property.

In Lyman v. Na.tional Mortgage Bond Corporation,
supra, while the plaintiff proved possession for four
years, he failed to prove payment of taxes for the fouryear period. Plaintiff showed redempt.ion of taxes for the
four-year period but the Court held on the authority of
Bowen v. Olsen, 2 Utah 2d 12, 268 P. 2d 983, that the
statute required payment and not redemption. Therefore
the Court held that plaintiff failed to make out a case.
There is nothing in the Lyman case which helps the plaintiffs here, for there is no dispute to the fact that defendants Bountiful Livestock Company, Salt Lake Pipeline
Company and Salt Lake Refining Company have been
in possession of the property since 1943 and paid all taxes
thereon since 1944.
Turning to the case at bar, it is seen that plaintiffs
as prior owners of the property are completely barred
from prosecuting this action under said Section 78-12-5.1
and 78-12-5.2 unless they were in possession of the property 'vi thin four years prior to the commencement of suit.
The plaintiffs do not allege possession or payment of
taxes within the four-year period prior to the commencement of the action. On the contrary, the complaints of
the plaintiffs affirmatively allege that the defendant
Bountiful Livestock Company took possession of and
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has ever since said purported sale had the use and benefit
an(l O<'('Upation of said land. (R. 2, -!7) It is submitted
that sueh allegations and proof are essential under the
provisions of the foreging statutes of limitation and are
a part of plain tiffs' case and in the absence of such
allegations and in the face of the admitted fact to the
contrary, these plaintiffs cannot recover.
Plaintiffs assert that the tax sale proceedings are
fatally defective within the rule announced in Telonis v.
Staley, 104 Utah 557, 144 P. 2d 513. It is admitted that
the County Auditor failed to attach the affidavit to the
a8~essment rolls. This, however, is immaterial to this
ea~e. The doctrine of Telonis v. Staley and other cases
along the same line is now all water under the judicial
bridge. The same argument was urged in Hansen v.
ill orris and Peterson v. Callister, supra, and brushed
aside by the Court upon the ground that it is now immaterial that defects arose in the tax proceedings. It is
further immaterial that title may never have actually
pa~sed from the plaintiffs.
(c) In Any Event, the Deed from Davis County

to Bountiful Livestock Company is a Written Instrument upon which Bountiful Livestock Company an its Successors can found
a Defense based upon Adverse Possession.
The rule is now too well established in Utah to admit
of any doubt that a tax title deed fro1n a county, although
substantially defective, is a \vritten instrument upon
\\Thich adverse possession may be founded. This propo~ition \Ya~ established in Welner v. Stearns, ±0 Utah 185,
120 Pac. 490, and has consistently been followed by this
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Court in several decisions. In the Stearns case1 purchase
agreement was made with the county, thereafter followed
by deed. The title of the county was substantially defective, ho\vever, the Court held that adverse possession
against the old owner commenced on the date of the contract and the entry into possession thereunder and the
fact that the deed to the county was defective was not
material. At page 195 and 196 of the Utah Report, the
Court held as follows :
"In the case at bar, as \Ve have seen, the
county claimed title under a tax deed, and hence
claimed from a source other than that through
which the respondent Borg claims. For the purpose of meeting the presumption that appellant
took and remained in possession in subordination
of the paper title, it is immaterial that the tax
deed was defective, and did not in law convey an
indefeasible title. Appellant's possession was just
as much adverse to Borg's title, although the deed
was defective, as it would have been if the deed
had conveyed a perfect title; the only difference
being that under a deed \vhich is defective the
claimant in possession must obtain the title, if he
obtains it at all, by virtue of the statute, w·hile if
the deed is good, and conveys an indefeasible title,
the title is in him from the time the deed is delivered."
1t is of the utmost importance, too, to recognize the

further proposition established in the Stearns case,
namely, that when the period of redemption has expired
and a tax deed has issued, the county thereafter holds
under a new title and any possession or act of dominion
taken by the county under such new title is adverse to the
original owner. Consequently, when the new title arises,
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and the county undertakes to deal with the property,
adverse possession commences to run against the old
0\Vner. rrhis proposition is further demonstrated and
affirrned in Bozievich v. Slechta, 109 Utah 373, 166 P.
2d 239, hereinafter considered.

W elner v. Stearns, stttpra, was followed by Baker v.
Goodman, 57 Utah 349, 194 Pac. 117. In the Goodman
case a parcel of land was sold to Goodman by the county
under a deed which was asserted to be a mere nullity
and in answering this contention this Court at page 355
of the Utah Report said:
"The tax deed in question, even though it be
held to be defective, was sufficient to give color
of title. This is the well-established law of this
state. W elner v. Stearns, 40 Utah 185, 120 Pac.
490, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 1175."
In the Slechta case, supra, the facts were that the
county leased the property to a tenant and thereafter
sold the property to a purchaser. The purchaser had not
been in possession and paid taxes for the seven years
statutory period but if the period during which the tenant
\vas in possession was added, the seven-year requirement
\vas complied with. The question was then whether
the adverse possession commenced when the tenant was
placed in possession by the county. It was the appellant's
contention that because of admitted defects in the tax
sale and May sale, the possession which the county took
of the property through its tenant "\vas in subordination
and not adverse to the right of the old owner and that
therefore there had not been adverse possession of the
property for a period of more than seven years before
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the commencement of the action. This Court at page 378
of the Utah Report meets the contention of the old O\vner
as follows:
"This case, therefore, rather than being an
aid to appellant's contention that the actual physical possession which the county took of the property through its tenants \vas in subordination to
the rights of the record owner, is 1nore pursuasive
for the proposition that the county took possession
by virtue of its purported ownership of the land.
Issuance of an auditor's tax deed did not give the
county possession. It was the act of placing tenants in actual possession which initiated possession by the county. The fact that the auditor's
deed was invalid and the further fact that because
of the invalidity of the May sale a further period
of redemption was vouchsafed to the record owner
does not change the character and nature of the
possession asserted through tenants from being
one under a claim of ownership. At the time \Yhen
the county took possession of the property it did
so claiming that it had a valid title, there having
been an attempt to comply with all the provisions
relating to tax sales. The fact that there were defects in the proceedings did not change the nature
of the county's clain1. It \vas open, hostile and
adverse to the record owner's right. See W elner
v. Stearns et al., 40 Utah 185 120 P. 490, Ann. Cas.
191-±,C, 1175."
T"ro rules of lR\\T are established by this series of
cases, namely, (i) a tax deed from a county, however
defective, is an instrument in \vriting sufficient under the
adverse possession statutes, and (ii) \vhen the county
receives a tax deed to property, ho\vever defective, this
beco1nes a source of a new claim of title and \Yhen the
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('ounty, acting on the basis of this ne'v clain1, undertakes
to dPal \Vith the property and assert dominion over
the ~ain<?, its aet in so doing starts the period running
for adver~P po~ses~ion against the old O\\·ner.
Applying the second proposition to this case, it is
clPar that 'vhen Davis County entered into the contract of
~ale covering the premises in question, it did so under
its elaim of title and its act of placing the purchaser
in possession under the contract "\vas open, hostile and
adverse to the old owner's rights and the period of adverse possession then commenced to run against the old
O\\·ners.
Turning to our statutes relating to adverse possession, it is seen from Section 78-12-8 and 78-12-9, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953, that where one founds a claim
upon a "\vritten instrument it must be an instrument as a
conveyance of the property in question or upon a decree
or judgment of a court. Accordingly, "rhere one holds
under a deed "\vhich purports to pass title but does not
do so, he holds under color of title under l'tah la"\v. This
i~ in aeeordance with the weight of authority in the
United ~tates. The rule is stated in 1 A1n. Jur., Sections
196 and 197, as follows:
'"It has been stated heretofore that 'color of
title' is title in appearance only; it is not title
in fact. Generally speaking, any instrument, however defective or imperfect, and no matter from
w·hat cause invalid, purporting to convey the land,
and showing the extent of the tenant's claim, may
be color of title; a claim to the land thereunder
will draw to the claimant the protection of the
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Statute of Limitations if the other requisites of
adverse possession are present.''
"The very act of claiming title by virtue of
an adverse possession for the statutory period
precludes the idea of a valid paper title, as do
the words 'color of title.' It is evident, therefore,
that the requirements as to color of title are sufficiently complied with by a possession held under
an instrument \Vhich, as a conveyance, is in fact
either voidable or void."
Nor is it necessary under Utah law that the holder
under the instrument act in good faith. In this case,
there is no evidence that Bountiful Livestock Company
did not act in good faith and any assertion to the contrary is \vithout merit. However, good faith is not a requisite element in order to initiate and establish a new
title by adverse possession under Utah la\v. Open, continuous adverse possession for the statutory period is
all that is required. See "The Adverse Possession of
Land Titles in Utah," Volume 3, Number 3, Page 294,
Utah Law Review, where Professor Montgomery states
the rule to be that :
"The second principal element of an adverse
possession is the formulation of the proper mental
attitude. This is not to suggest, however, that the
claimant must act in good faith for, wl1ile it may
be a somewhat shocking concept that one can by
the combined use of force, fraud, and deceit acquire title to the land of another by adverse possession, in the absence of a statutory provision
to the contrary, good faith is entirely unnecessary."
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The rule which prevails in Utah as established by
many cases is that possession must be op.en, notorious,
continuous, exclusive and adverse. See Cooper v. Carter
Oil Company, 7 Utah 2d 9, 316 P. 2d 320, and Bozievich
v. Slechta, supra. Nothing more is required. By advancing the foregoing propositions, we do not admit that a
deed from the County to Bountiful Livestock Company
failed to pass title to the grantee. If it should be so
determined, it was, however, clearly sufficient to constitute color of title under our adverse possession statute.
(d) Plaintiffs are now Barred by the General
Adverse Possession Statutes.
Defendants have pleaded the adverse possession
statutes in defense. Adverse possession may be used by
a defendant either as a shield ·or a sword. In other
words, defendants may assert adverse possession to defeat the claim of the plaintiff or affirmatively to quiet
their own title. See 1 Am. J ur., Adverse Possession,
Sections 15 and 16. Defendants have elected to employ
the defense as a shield. Although defendants have
pleaded these statutes as a defense, they did not need to
do so. The defense is available simply under a denial of
plaintiffs' title. See 1 Am. Jur., Adverse Possession,
Section 235.
Prior to the 1951 Amendment, a period of seven
years was required for adverse possession. However, under the foregoing Sections 78-12-7.1, and 78-12-12.1, this
4as been shortened to four years, where claim is made
under a tax title. In this case, Bountiful Livestock Company prior to its deed to the pipeline company had held
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for much more than the seven-year period. So it becomes
immaterial which period is applied.
It is admitted here that taxes have been continually
vaid since 19±4 and that these defendants have been in
adverse possession since 19±3. The plaintiffs affirmatively allege such possession as hereinabove set forth
and seek to recover the value of the use and occupation
of the land. The sufficiency of the adverse possession
of Bountiful Livestock Company is admitted and it is 'veil
within the rule announced by this Court in Cooper v. Carter Oil Company, supra.
(e) The Bar which Prevents Plaintiffs from Recovery against Bountiful Livestock Company, Salt Lake Pipeline Company and Salt
Lake Refining Company Likewise Bars the
Plaintiffs from any Recovery against Davis
County.
The plaintiffs assert that the judgment entered by
the Court in this case precludes them from the exercise
of a right which they assert to recover the property
against Davis County. The contention of the plaintiff::;
appears to be grounded upon the assun1ption that if
plaintiffs cannot recover the property in a direct attack
upon the transaction between Davis County and Bountiful Livestock Company they should nevertheless be entitled to recover the property indirectly in the event that
Davis County succeeds under its cross-complaint against
the defendant livestock company and its grantees.
For the purpose of testing the merit of such contention, and without admitting any rights of Davis County
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to l'P('over und(~r its cross-cornplaint, let it be assurned
that Davis County succeeds under its cross-complaint
and recovers the property against Bountiful Livestock
Cornpany and it~ grantees, ean the plaintiffs in any event
then rPeover the prernises from Davis County~ It is
submitted the plaintiffs could not so recover, for the
following reasons.
Under the doctrine announced in the Slechta case,
::;upra, "~hen Davis County undertook to deal with the
property as its own, placing the livestock company in possession under the contract, and most assuredly when it
dPecled the property to Bountiful Livestock Company,
the statute of limitations began to run against the old
o\vner~ and now precludes them from recovery. As
against these plaintiffs this limitation runs in favor not
only of the livestock company and its grantee, but also
in favor of Davis County. !ioreover, if the deed frorn
Davis County to the livestock company failed to pass title
to the latter or if Davis County may for any reason be
able to set that deed aside still plaintiffs are barred
from recovery under the rule announced in Slechtrt,
c-..·upra. For under that rule the act of the County in placing a tenant in possession starts the statute running
against the old O\\Tner. If the County were able to set
a~ide

its deed to the livestock company and recover back

the property the livestock company and its grantees
\vould nevertheless during all their period of occupancy
be tenants at \vill of the County. l\Iany decisions support
this proposition. In Tate v. Gai-nes (Okla.) 105 Pac. 193,
the Court states the rule as follows:
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"It has been uniformly held that possession
under an invalid conveyance or contract of sale
creates a tenancy at "Till, and where a tenant goes
into possession under an invalid lease his tenancy
at its inception is merely a tenancy at 'vill. ... So,
while the conveyance was wholly void and of no
effect in itself, the possession of the grantee
amounted to a tenancy at will, not made so by the
void conveyance, but because out of the effort to
deal came a permission to enter the land relieving
grantee of the imputation of and liability for tres.
pass."
To the same effect see : Hall v. Wall ace (Cal.) 26 Pac. 360;
Packard v. RaiJlroad Co. (Ill.) 46 Ill. App. 2-±-±; Lehman
v. Nolti,r,ig (~{o.) 56 ~Io. App. 549; Howard v. Merriam
(Mass.) 5 Cush 583; Mcintosh v. Lee (Io,va) 10 N.W.
895; Peters v. Holder (Okla.) 136 Pac. 400.
It is asserted by the plaintiffs that should the deed
from Davis County to Bountiful Livestock Company
be for any reason set aside and should Davis County recover back the property, it would then be holding the
premises in trust for the plaintiffs. Such a contention
is manifestly "rithout merit, for under the rule announced
in Slechta, supra, the assertion of title by the County
when it places the buyer in possession is adverse to the
claim of the old o"'"ner and sweeps away any vestige of
trust relationship.
CON,CL US ION
The judgment of the trial court dismissing the suit of
these plaintiffs against all defendants must be affirmed
for the reasons that: (i) The deed from Davis County
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to the livestock company is valid, ( ii) Even though invalid, the deed is voidable and not void, (iii) If voidable,
the right to avoid the deed belongs to the County and
not to the livestock company, (iv) In any event the statutP~ of limitation~ and of adverse possession applicable
in this case and the decisions of the Courts construing
the same preclude these plaintiffs from any recovery.
Respectfully submitted,
S. N. CORNWALL
VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & 1IcCARTHY
Attorneys for Respondents
Bountiful Livestock Compa;ny,
Salt Lake Pipel~ne Company,
and Salt Lake Refining Company
Suite 300, 65 South Main Street
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
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